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I’d like to begin, if I may, by repeating myself. When I spoke at the Institute’s official 
launch last June, I quoted W.V. Quine’s remark that logic is an old subject, and since 
1879 it has been a great one; and I commented that whatever the truth of this, it is 
undeniably true that philosophy is an old subject and has been a great one since the 5th 
century BC. The foundation of an institute of philosophy in the University of London 
has been, in my opinion, a great thing for philosophy and for the University. Our 
mission is to promote and support philosophy of the highest quality in all its forms, 
inside and outside the university. With our programmes of events, fellowships and 
research facilitation, I think we have been carrying out this mission pretty well since 
our foundation in 2005. But I have already said enough in public about the Institute. 
Given the occasion, it is appropriate for me to say something instead about 
philosophy itself. 
I have to confess, however, that the philosophy of philosophy has not been one 
of the discipline’s greatest achievements. In a fine understatement, the Australian 
philosopher David Armstrong once called it an ‘unrewarding subject’. No-one is 
really quite sure what philosophy is, and in my opinion all accounts of what it is are 
utterly unconvincing. For myself, I don’t find this particularly worrying. We aren’t 
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really sure what science is, either, or poetry, or art – in the sense that we can’t define 
these practices, or tell someone who is unfamiliar with them what they are. But those 
who know enough about these things know them when they see them, and this is the 
same for philosophy as for art and science. Defining things is a pretty over-rated 
activity. 
What is odd about philosophy, though, is that every so often philosophers are 
told that philosophy is impossible or that it cannot be done, or that it is all based on 
some kind of mistake. And some of these denouncements have come from the most 
influential philosophers of the 20th century. Ludwig Wittgenstein came to think that 
philosophy was a kind of disease which was in need of therapy rather than 
government funding; Martin Heidegger thought that things started going wrong with 
Plato, when philosophers started to lose sight of what he called the ‘question of 
being’; and W.V. Quine thought that philosophy should hand over its traditional role 
to science, allowing only that ‘philosophy of science is philosophy enough’. 
Philosophy itself has perversely collaborated in its own public denunciation. 
When I was a first year undergraduate, I was told to read A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth 
and Logic, which as you will all know, begins with the line: ‘the traditional disputes 
of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful’.1 This 
was before I had any idea whatsoever of what the traditional disputes of philosophers 
even were. Imagine starting a degree course in engineering or history by being given a 
book which begins: ‘the subject you have decided to study is essentially rubbish’. 
With friends like this, philosophy hardly needs enemies. Yet, as with the 
rumours Mark Twain heard about his own death, these rumours of the death of 
philosophy are greatly exaggerated. Anyone familiar with contemporary philosophy 
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will know that philosophy is far from dead, and far from impossible. The ideas of the 
philosophers just mentioned are as disputable as any in philosophy – if not more so. 
We are not obliged to accept what Wittgenstein, Heidegger or Quine say about the 
possibility of philosophy. A better view is that of my teacher Hugh Mellor, who 
would typically answer the charge that philosophy is impossible by saying that we 
know it is possible, because it exists. 
Nonetheless, it has to be admitted that philosophy is not popular in some 
quarters, even outside philosophy. It is often criticised for being too arid and 
‘technical’, as well as irrelevant to the rest of society. John Gray once memorably – 
though surely unfairly – commented that contemporary philosophy has as much 
relevance to society as heraldry.  
It is true that much philosophy is pretty dry and can appear frustratingly 
pedantic. This is not something new: it’s always been like this. Try as you might, it is 
hard to get much aesthetic edification from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although 
contemporary philosophy – particularly that inspired by logic with its ps and qs, is 
sometimes singled out for special opprobrium – the idea that ‘all charms fly at the 
mere touch of cold philosophy’ was no less true in Keats’s day as it is today. 
But the criticism is misguided. Philosophy is, first and foremost, an 
intellectual attempt to understand the world and our place in it; it is not an aesthetic 
project, it is not about charm, and it does not aim towards aesthetic pleasure, 
satisfaction or edification. It aims towards understanding. It is, nonetheless, a curious 
feature of philosophy that it inspires dismissive remarks and even contempt from 
outside. This is something that requires a little reflection. Few outside mathematics 
would dare to criticise the most abstract projects of pure mathematics; but for some 
reason, philosophy is fair game.  
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I am not thinking here simply of the misguided attempts to call upon the 
authority of Heidegger or Wittgenstein and declare that philosophy is over; or (even 
worse) of those who think that no tradition of abstract study or non-practical study is 
worthwhile. I am thinking even of those who clearly believe that there is such a thing 
as the truth about the world, who think that we can know it, and that this knowledge 
can be something worth having for its own sake. Stephen Hawking, one of the 
world’s leading cosmologists and one of the most famous scientists of our age, has 
this to say in his best-seller, A Brief History of Time: 
 
‘Philosophers have reduced the scope of their inquiry so much that 
Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher of this century, said, “The sole 
remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language”. What a come-down 
from the great tradition of Aristotle and Kant!’2 
 
Hawking says this in the course of explaining how physics has taken over the role of 
philosophy in answering the big questions. But two things about this remark 
immediately stand out. First, I am not an expert on Wittgenstein, but as far as I know, 
Wittgenstein never said what Hawking says he did. Still, he did say some very similar 
things, so we can pass over that one. Second, it is odd to use Wittgenstein as an 
example of a philosopher who has ‘reduced the scope of his inquiry’, since 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (to which Hawking may be alluding) is a work which 
attempts to make claims about the entire world, beginning famously with ‘The world 
is all that is the case’ and ending with ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must 
be silent’. In the preface to the book, Wittgenstein said that ‘the problems have in 
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essentials been finally  solved’. He may have tried to do this and failed, but no-one 
could have accused Wittgenstein of downsizing his ambitions. 
Nonetheless, I suspect that there may be readers of  Stephen Hawking’s book 
who share his view on philosophy – perhaps because of encounters with pendants 
demanding that you explain what you mean by a certain word, or to ‘define your 
terms’; or perhaps because of a familiarity with something known as ‘linguistic 
philosophy’ which flourished as an explicit ideology for a few years in Oxford in the 
1950s. 
 The analysis of language is a fine thing, of course; but what has it got to do 
with philosophy? Philosophers philosophise about language (in part) because they 
philosophise about almost everything, and because language raises especially difficult  
philosophical questions. But philosophy is, as I have said, an attempt to understand 
the world and our place in it, and it is hard to see why the analysis of language should 
have any specially privileged role in this attempt. As the early 20th century 
philosopher Frank Ramsey said, ‘we are not schoolboys parsing sentences’. So what 
can Wittgenstein possibly have meant when he said that the remaining task for 
philosophy is the analysis of language? It turns out that the answer to this question is 
more interesting that someone like Stephen Hawking might think. 
 Wittgenstein is sometimes classified as one of the first ‘analytic’ philosophers, 
thinking of analytic philosophy as a tradition which began with Bertrand Russell and 
G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th century. I agree with those who argue that the term 
‘analytic’ in the phrase ‘analytic philosophy’ is now so disputed as to be almost 
worthless, but nonetheless the historical movements here are relatively well-
understood. Moore and Russell led what became known as the ‘revolt against 
idealism’. The idealism in question was the metaphysical view, inspired by Hegel, 
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that we can never experience the world as it really is, but our experience and thought 
can only approximate to the ultimate reality, which some of these idealists (the most 
distinguished of which were FH Bradley, JME McTaggart and TH Green) called the 
‘absolute’. Bradley and Green thought that ordinary empirical judgements, like the 
judgement that the cat is on the mat, cannot be simply true. Rather these judgements 
can only ever be partial approximations to the truth. 
 Moore and Russell rejected this completely. They insisted that ordinary 
judgements like this could be simply and absolutely true or false. The judgement that 
the cat is on the mat can be made by confronting experience directly; we can judge 
that the cat is on the mat on the basis of our experience. The judgement is true or false 
not because of how some more or less inadequate representation relates to the 
absolute, but simply because how things are – the cat, the mat, the one being on the 
other – in the world around us. 
 They realised, of course, that they could not just say this; they had to say how 
it was possible. How it is possible to make a judgement about the world around us? 
What is required of us, and of the world, and how should they be related? We can 
understand objective truth – truth about the mind-independent world – only if we 
understand judgement. But to understand judgement we have to understand what is 
judged. Russell and Moore called what is judged a proposition. Propositions are not 
words, they are not even sentences, they are what sentences express. An interest in 
propositions is not an interest in words: it is most fundamentally an interest in truth 
and therefore in reality. It is propositions which are true and false, and so the truth or 
falsehood of judgements reduces to the truth and falsehood of propositions. To 
understand judgement, then, we have to understand the proposition. 
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 The problem Russell and Moore now encountered was how to understand the 
structure or the unity of the proposition. We can best understand his by comparing 
propositions with language. A sentence, like ‘the cat is on the mat’ says something, or 
it can be used to say something. A list of words, ‘the’, ‘cat’ ‘on’, ‘the’ ‘mat’ does not 
say anything – it is just a list. To say something, the words have to be combined into a 
sentence. The German logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege had answered this by 
saying that the different parts of a sentence have to play very different kinds of role. 
Names are fundamentally different kind of terms from general terms (what he called 
‘concept-words’, what are called today ‘predicates’). Concept-words he thought of as 
being functional expressions, exactly like functional expressions in mathematics 
(square root, addition and so on). Names – words for objects – are the inputs for the 
concept expressions. The outputs were names for truth and falsehood. 
Russell thought that propositions – the things we judge– are made up of, or 
constituted by, the very things we think about. Russell thought this because of a 
fundamental principle of his philosophy: what we can make a judgement about must 
be independent of our mind. He moved from this to the claim that what we judge must 
be independent of our minds, and he thought that this requires that what we judge is 
made up of things independent of our minds. So the proposition that the cat is on the 
mat is actually constituted by the cat, the mat and the relationship they have.  
But the proposition could not simply be the collection of the cat, the mat and 
the relationship. For that collection exists whether the cat is on the mat or the mat is 
on the cat, or neither is on either. The collection is the same, however they are related. 
So how then are the constituents of a proposition related, on Russell’s view? 
Something must account for the way these things ‘hang together’ in the proposition, 
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but what could it be? This question gave Russell one of his biggest headaches, and it 
was one he never quite managed to get rid of. 
There were two questions. First, how can the constituents in a proposition 
combine in order for judgement to be possible? And second, how can things in the 
world combine in order for judgement to be correct? Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein 
all gave different answers to this second question. Their answers can be summarised 
like this. Frege thought that objects were one kind of thing (complete in themselves, 
not needing anything else for their completion) but properties (which he called 
‘concepts’) were a completely different kind of thing. Concepts contain ‘gaps’ so to 
speak, whereas objects don’t – objects are complete in themselves. When an object is 
(so to speak) ‘put’ into the gap in the concept, then this yields either truth or 
falsehood. Judgement is possible because what can be judged picks out objects and 
their properties, and their combination yields the value true or false. 
On Russell’s view, both objects and properties are complete in themselves. So 
an account of judgement needs to explain how they fit together. One version of his 
view was that in addition to the cat and the mat, there is the relation between them – 
the relation of something’s being on something – which something entire in itself, but 
also there is a complex ‘formed by certain constituents combined in a certain 
manner’, where the ‘mode’ of combination is not itself one of the ‘constituents of the 
complex’.3 
Wittgenstein rejected both Frege’s and Russell’s views. Wittgenstein’s 
solution to this problem in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (published in 1921) 
rested on a wholly different account of the relation between judgment and reality. The 
world, he says at the beginning of the Tractatus, is the ‘totality of facts, not of things’. 
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At the ground level, there are the facts: everything that is the case. There are objects, 
too; objects are the constitutents of facts, but they are not complete in themselves. 
Rather, objects are only what they are because of the ways they combine in facts. In a 
sense, then, objects also have ‘gaps‘ in them. It is the gaps in objects which enable 
them to be constituents of the atomic facts, since it is what enables them to combine 
with other objects. This is why Wittgenstein says ‘In the atomic fact, objects hang one 
in another, like the links in a chain’.4 The thing about the links in a chain is that they 
are incomplete in themselves. To paraphrase a remark of Colin Johnston’s, the 
theories of Frege and Russell both ‘have it that it is something other than the objects 
which is responsible for the unity of atomic facts’.5 Wittgenstein’s alternative is that 
it is the objects themselves which allow essentially for the possibility of unity: this is 
what it means to say that objects hang together like the links in a chain. (I am very 
happy to acknowledge, especially on this occasion, that I owe whatever understanding 
I have of this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to Colin Johnston, a former student 
at UCL and now a Jacobsen Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy.) 
 Wittgenstein’s account of truth and the proposition required that the 
fundamental structure of the world be a certain way: it should contain simple objects 
connected in atomic facts. The basic language used to describe the atomic facts 
should parallel this too. But – and this is the problem – the world and language does 
not seem this way. So what we must explain is why it is that our language does not 
seem to involve statements of these peculiar atomic facts, why we don’t have any 
names in our language for the simple objects etc., -- given that in reality they must be 
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5 ‘The Unity of Tractarian Fact’ forthcoming. 
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like this. In other words, we have to explain the relationship between the appearance 
of the world in language, and its reality. 
 The account that we have to give must explain how the ordinary statements we 
make are related to the underlying facts.  We need to give an analysis of language 
because we do not confront the simple propositions or the simple facts of the world 
neat, so to speak. Wittgenstein’s view was that we need an analysis of ordinary 
propositions, which will (in Wittgenstein’s words) 
 
‘come to the point where it reaches propositional forms which are not 
themselves composed of simpler propositional forms.  We must eventually 
reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which 
cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such.  The 
propositions which represent this ultimate connexion of terms I call, after 
Russell, atomic propositions … It is the task of the theory of knowledge to 
find them and to understand their construction out of the words or symbols.  
This task is very difficult, and Philosophy has hardly yet begun to tackle it..6  
 
Where language and the world are concerned, then, things are not as they seem. Our 
language as we have it is not a transparent guide to reality, but needs to be analysed in 
order to get at the ultimate reality. 
 The large theme in philosophy that Wittgenstein’s remarks point towards, 
then, is the relationship between appearance and reality, between how things seem 
and how they are. Far from being a recent invention of ‘analytic’ or ‘linguistic’ 
philosophy, this theme is as old as philosophy itself. Before Socrates, Parmenides had 
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denied that the world contained any real plurality; plurality and difference were mere 
appearance, the underlying reality must be ‘one’ (whatever that means). Plato thought 
that the world we experience is a kind of illusion, not the ultimate reality. For Plato, 
the world of appearances was, in Yeats’s magical phrase ‘but a spume that plays upon 
a ghostly paradigm of things’. Aristotle, by contrast, thought that the ultimate realities 
of the world (which he called substances) were things that we did encounter in 
experience. This is the point of the contrast between Plato and Aristotle, represented 
in one of the few great paintings of philosophers, Raphael’s School of Athens – where 
Aristotle calmly holds his hand towards the earth and Plato points towards the skies. 
 Conceived in this general way, we can see the theme exemplified throughout 
philosophy. Leibniz, for example, thought that cause and effect was a kind of 
appearance, and the underlying reality was what he called the pre-established 
harmony between substances. Kant called the world of everyday objects the 
‘phenomenal world’ – the word ‘phenomenal’ deriving from the Greek word for 
appearance – and distinguished it from the world of things in themselves. And I have 
already mentioned, the idealist tradition which followed Kant and Hegel, was 
exemplified in England by F.H. Bradley’s most famous work, Appearance and 
Reality published in 1883. 
 The general problem of understanding the relationship between the appearance 
of things and the underlying reality has not disappeared from contemporary 
philosophy. Contemporary metaphysics is naturalistic in approach, meaning roughly 
that metaphysical theories must be informed by the discoveries of natural sciences, 
pre-eminently physics. But the world according to contemporary physics is made up 
of a four- (or more-) dimensional spacetime, and the apparently solid objects 
12 
occupying it are made up of combinations of smaller and more weird and unfamiliar 
particles held together by fields of force, in what is mostly empty space. 
But this is not how things seem to us. We don’t see things in four dimensions, 
we don’t see the past or the future, and objects do not look to be mostly empty space. 
So even on a naturalistic world picture, any adequate account of the world has to 
explain how the world as we experience it (the world of appearance) is related to the 
world as described by physics. I think it’s fair to say that attempts to do this have not 
got very far. 
 I do not mean this to be an objection to the naturalistic world picture. 
Wittgenstein once asked why people used to think that the sun went round the earth. 
One of his students (we might even say, his disciples) said ‘because it looks as if the 
sun goes round the earth’. Wittgenstein responded: ‘but how would it look if the earth 
went round the sun?’. The obvious answer is: exactly the same. We can make a 
parallel point about the idea that matter might be largely empty space. Why did 
people think that matter was solid all the way down? Because it looks as if matter is 
solid all the way down! But how would it look if it were mostly empty space? Exactly 
the same! 
The point I am making is not about the correctness of the naturalistic world 
view, but rather about how we are to explain the appearance of things if this view 
were correct. We can see this question is of the same general form as the question 
which arises for Plato, Leibniz, Kant and also for Wittgenstein: given that reality is a 
certain way, how do we explain the fact that it does not seem that way?  
 We can now see then why Stephen Hawking is so completely wrong in what 
he says about philosophy: Wittgenstein’s views in his Tractatus are not a ‘comedown’ 
from the great tradition of Aristotle and Kant. Like these two philosophers, the 
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Tractatus is involved in its own engagement with the problem of appearance and 
reality. It may give an unbelievable solution to that problem – but this can’t have been 
Hawking’s complaint, since Kant’s solution is equally unbelievable. Hawking’s 
criticism was that philosophy has downsized its ambitions, maybe because it reduced 
itself to (as it may be) parsing sentences. I hope my brief remarks about the history of 
the problem of judgement and the unity of the proposition have shown how mistaken 
this is. Philosophy has not ‘reduced the scope of its enquiry’. The enquiry has the 
same scope, even if the results are somewhat different. 
 The point I want to make here, though, is not just to tick off Stephen Hawking 
– to repeat the words of Bob Dylan, ‘don’t criticise what you can’t understand’ – 
enjoyable though this is. It is rather to point out the general structure of the pervasive 
theme of appearance and reality, and how this theme has manifested itself throughout 
western philosophy, even at times when it might seem as if the traditional themes of 
philosophy had been transformed into something else. An even more general point is 
that philosophy is a tradition of thought, whose problems are shaped by the solutions 
posed by previous generations, and that is one reason why philosophers should study 
their history. When considering the question of the relationship between appearance 
and reality, we are in the position, like Newton, of standing on the shoulders of giants. 
This does not mean that we should go so far as to let giants stand on our shoulders; 
that way, we won’t get to see anything. But if we want to understand what we are 
doing when philosophising, we have to understand whose shoulders we are standing 
on. 
 In this area of philosophy, I claim, we are trying to understand the relationship 
between appearance and reality. Some might say that talking about ‘reality’ in this 
cavalier way ignores some of the most important developments in philosophy, those 
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developments which have questioned whether there is such a thing as reality or truth, 
or whether this rests upon some misguided conception of our ability to comprehend 
the world. This idea really deserves a lecture all of its own, but you will be relieved to 
know that time is short, and so I can only be dogmatic.  
It seems to me that the frequently repeated claim that certain philosophers 
have undermined the applicability of the concepts of truth and reality is entirely 
mistaken. This simply has not been shown, or demonstrated, or established. It is true 
that although the concept of truth is in some ways a simple concept – Donald 
Davidson once called it ‘one of the simplest concepts we have’7 – the debates about 
the concept have been among the most complex. However, the fact that there is 
dispute about the concept of truth does not imply that it is in some way dodgy or that 
we should abandon it. Nor should the fact that people disagree about what is true. 
Disagreements about what is true are disagreements about what is the case, or about 
how things are. But without the concept of what is true – or the concept of how things 
are – we would be at a loss to say what real disagreement is at all. 
 The same goes for the concept of reality. Reality – what there is – is, like 
truth, something indefinable, in the sense that the concept of reality cannot be defined 
in terms of ‘simpler’ concepts. Someone who did not understand the concept of 
reality could not be brought to understand it by saying that it is what there is. And of 
course there are disagreements about what reality is like, some of which are hard to 
resolve. This does not make reality – any more than truth – a dispensable, outmoded, 
inapplicable or even an especially problematic concept. Without the concept of reality 
we would not be able to make sense of the idea of any inquiry, the results of which 
are constrained by how things are. We cannot dispense with these concepts without 
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dispensing with the idea of inquiry itself. (These dogmatic pronouncements will be 
not be news to philosophers; but experience has shown that they sometimes need to 
be made.) 
My theme – appearance and reality – is, of course, impossibly broad. And as 
the examples above show, there is not one thing which can be called the problem of 
appearance and reality. I am not saying that there is. There are many problems which 
can be understood as falling under this heading, and we can only make progress by 
focussing on individual versions of these problems. So in the rest of this lecture, I 
want to make some comments about how this theme has been exemplified in an area 
of my own research, the philosophy of mind.  
 My interest here is in appearance, rather than reality. In thinking about 
appearance, we should distinguish between questions about the appearances of things 
and questions about the nature of appearances themselves. (If I were coming from a 
slightly different discipline in the humanities, I might have used the general algorithm 
for generating academic paper titles, and called this lecture ‘The appearance of nature 
and the nature of appearance’.) The question I previously raised about how to 
accommodate our ordinary conception of objects within the physicalist world picture, 
is (so to speak) about the appearance of nature, the appearance of things. But there is 
also the question of the nature of the appearances themselves. What is it for 
something to appear at all? What is it, for example, for someone to have something 
presented to them in experience or thought? This is a question in the philosophy of 
mind. 
The philosophy of mind is not the science of the mind, although its results 
should of course be consistent with truths discovered by any science. A large part of 
the philosophy of mind consists of properly identifying the subject-matter of any 
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study of the mind. We know that digestion is not a mental process, and visual 
perception is; but why are things like this? It is not an answer to say: because 
psychology does not study digestion. This gets matters the wrong way around: 
psychology does not study digestion because digestion is not a mental process and 
psychology is the science of the mental. 
What we are after, as philosophers of mind, is an understanding of our mental 
life and what makes it mental. Part of this is understanding, it seems to me, consists in 
understanding the appearance of mind, what my UCL colleague Mike Martin has 
nicely called ‘the shallows of the mind’. Since ‘phenomena’ literally means 
appearance, then ‘phenomenology’ would be a good word for this aspect of the 
philosophy of mind, had it not been already captured as a word for an approach to 
philosophy as a whole. 
This idea of phenomenology as the systematic study of mental phenomena or  
appearances derives from Edmund Husserl. Husserl put the concept of intentionality 
at the heart of his philosophy. ‘Intentionality’ here means the direction of the mind 
upon its objects: the fact that, as Husserl’s teacher Franz Brentano put it, ‘in the idea, 
something is conceived, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, 
in hate hated, in desire desired and so on’. I think Husserl and Brentano were right to 
give intentionality such a central role, and it seems to me that it is this idea we need to 
understand the idea of appearance. 
Throughout his writings on intentionality, Husserl always took care to 
distinguish the object of an experience from what we would now call the content of 
the experience (but he would call the noema or the meaning of the experience). I 
would express this distinction as follows. For every state of mind, there is something 
which it is its object. If you believe something, the object of your belief is what you 
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believe; if you want something, the object of belief is what you want; if you fear 
something, the object of your fear is what you fear; and so on … you get the general 
idea. In addition to the object of an mental state, there is also the way in which this 
object can be presented to you. The very same cat can be presented to you in different 
ways.  
How do we apply the ideas of object and content to perceptual experience? 
The natural and straightforward thing to say is that the object of a visual experience is 
what we see. If the cat is what we see, then it is the object of our experience. The 
content of the experience would then be the way in which the cat is presented to you 
in experience – in the case of vision, it is the way the cat looks. The cat is one thing, it 
is the object of your experience; the way it looks is something else. A cat can look a 
certain way – it can look friendly, for example – even though it is not that way. This 
is one reason for distinguishing between the object and the content of an experience: 
the object (the cat) can be the same though the content (the way it looks) is different.  
Husserl’s distinction between the content and the object of an experience 
applies, then, to perception as it does to other mental states. But there is a difference 
here between perception and other mental states, in particular the states of mind I was 
talking about earlier, belief and judgement. When you believe that the cat is on the 
mat, what do you believe? The pleonastic answer is: that the cat is on the mat. The 
object of your belief is a proposition, in the sense of Moore and Russell. It is 
something that can be true or false: the cat can be on the mat, or it can not. For this 
reason, Russell called belief or judgement a propositional attitude: an attitude to a 
proposition. I will use Russell’s terminology in what follows. 
Things are not the same with perceptual experience. The object of your 
experience – by my simple formula – is what you experience: the things around you. 
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Of course, you cannot experience things without experiencing them as being a certain 
way. Remember the different ways you can experience the same cat. But this does not 
mean that what you experience is the way you experience the cat: Husserl’s 
distinction between object and content must be borne in mind. But the point should be 
clear that if we are going to start our inquiry with the idea of what we perceive at all, 
then we should hang on to the idea that what we perceive are the things around us. 
The content of our perception is something else.  
 Unfortunately a broad consensus in the philosophy of perception today does 
not recognise this, and for this reason has been making a mess of the idea of the 
content of experience. The consensus is that perceptual experience has a structure a 
bit like belief or judgement. This idea – one which I once mistakenly endorsed myself 
– needs to be undermined if we are really to understand what appearances are. 
 One of the world’s leading philosophers of mind, John McDowell, has 
famously said that when one experiences the world, ‘one takes in, for instance, sees, 
that things are thus and so. That is the sort of thing one can also, for instance, judge’.8 
McDowell’s point is that just as you can see that the cat is on the mat, you can also 
judge that the cat is on the mat. The content of the experience is the content of a 
possible judgement. He thinks that saying this is the only way to account for the 
relation between mind and world. 
And yet it seems to me that this position cannot be right, since there is no 
plausible sense in which what you judge is the sort of thing that you can see to be the 
case. If I judge that the cat is on the mat, I may do that because I see that it is, but that 
does not mean that what I see is what I judge. What I see is a particular cat, of a 
particular colour, curled up in a particular way. What I judge is silent on all this. The 
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judgement does not specify the colour of the cat, its specific position, its size, its level 
of furriness … and do on. What I judge is merely that the cat is on the mat, and this is 
compatible with many ways in which the cat can actually be. The visual experience of 
the cat, by contrast, is compatible with far fewer ways. Therefore, I claim, what you 
see, or visually experience, cannot be the same as what you judge. McDowell’s claim 
is incorrect. 
Thinking of perception as a propositional attitude in this way can lead to even 
more strange claims. Take the following example from a recent paper by Alex Byrne, 
a prominent philosopher of perception:  
 
All parties agree … that perceiving is very much like a traditional 
propositional attitude, such as believing or intending … when one has a 
perceptual experience, one bears the perception relation to a certain 
proposition p.9 
 
In my view, Byrne has let whatever analogy there is between perception and belief 
run away with him. He says that in perception, the perceiver bears a perception 
relation to a proposition. But surely if we bear the perception relation to anything, it is 
to the perceptible things around us, not to any proposition. Yet the view that 
perception is a relation to a proposition derives from over-generalising from the case 
of belief and judgement: just as belief is a relation to a proposition, so perception 
must be too. 
This is why I don’t think that these remarks of Byrne’s are a mere slip: rather 
they spring from the mistaken idea that perception is a propositional attitude. For it is 
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perfectly OK to say that when you judge something, you bear a ‘judging’ relation to 
what you judge; just as it is perfectly OK to say that when you see something, you 
‘bear a seeing relation’ to what you see. Things only start going wrong when you add 
the assumption that what you see to be the case is what you can judge. For then you 
are led, unless you are very careful, into saying that what you see is a proposition, 
since that is also what you judge. But if this, as I have argued, is absurd, then so is the 
idea that perception or seeing is fundamentally a propositional attitude. 
 This conclusion indicates the direction in which I think philosophising about 
perceptual appearances should go. Where does reality come into all this? The mind is 
part of reality, so if having a mind is having things appear to you a certain way, then 
this is part of reality too. In addition, the science of the mind studies the mind. We 
might call this the underlying reality, so long as we do not thereby deny that the 
appearance of mind might also be an appearance that is fundamentally correct. To 
understand whether or not this is so, however, we have to gain a correct 
understanding of the appearances. This seems a nice way to bring me to the 
conclusion of this lecture: that to understand reality, we have first to understand 
appearances.  
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